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Cas<3 No, 
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Appeal from the verdict of a District Court Jury 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, V
 C a s e NQ> 
14607 
-vs-
DAVID LEWIS MOORE, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Lhc oritur of possessing 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute the same, 
a violation of the Utah Cnd< Annotated § 58-37-8 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A jury found appellant guilty as charged before 
the Honorable Venoy Christofferson. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was brought to trial on April 14, 1976. 
Sixteen jurors were called to be questioned. The 
prosecutor was given a chance to voir dire the prospective 
jurors and asked: 
"Is there anything in any of your 
minds that I haven't brought up that 
you think would prevent you from 
rendering a fair verdict in this 
case?" (T-23). 
Thereafter Mr. Rock, a prospective juror answered: 
"I feel very strongly against 
people that use or sell narcotics. 
I don't know whether I could be fair 
or not." (T-23). 
After a brief discussion the prosecutor said: 
"Okay. Wellf perhaps defense 
counsel would go into this point 
a little more." (T-24). 
The defense counsel did not go into the point but later 
challenged the juror for cause. The trial court denied 
the challenge since no foundation had been laid by the 
defense counsel (T-29,30). Mr. Rock never served on the 
jury which convicted appellant. 
Defense attorney asked if any prospective jurors 
knew the prosecutor (T-26). Mr. Rhodes remained silent. 
Later at a lunch break Mr. Rhodes, who was then sitting 
as a juror, told the prosecutor, in the hearing of the 
defense attorney that he realized that he knew the prosecutor's 
father (T-34). 
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After that Mr. Rhodes said he was in a hurry but 
the prosecutor said "Well, there is some more evidence to 
be presented." (T-3 4). Later the prosecutor decided 
not to call one of his witnesses, which appellant alleges 
was an "apparent" attempt to patronize the juror (appellant's 
brief p. 5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN JURY SELECTION. 
Appellant challenged two jurors for cause. The 
trial court denied the challenges. Appellant now appeals 
that decision. Respondent submits that the decision of 
the trial court should be affirmed for any one of four 
reasons. A trial judge has broad discretion in which to 
make decisions concerning jury selection. Thus his 
judgment should be given great weight by the appellate 
court. Second, dun re* his voir dire of the jury, appellant 
failed to s^k any questions concerning his suspicions of 
two jurors. Thus, Y failed to lay before the trial court 
any foundation upon which to base an objection of alleged 
bias. Furthermore, the decision not to ask any voir dire 
questions concerning possible bias was a strategy move 
by appellant. Therefore, any error was self-induced. 
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Finally, appellant has not carried his burden on appeal 
in that he has failed to show that any actual prejudice 
resulted from the trial court decision* 
It should be first noted that ci trial judge is 
granted broad discretion in handling a trial (Barber 
v, Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974)) and particularly 
as he conducts the selection of a jury (State v. BeBee, 
110 Utah, 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946)). The trial judge 
has the prime responsibility to determine facts and to 
judge the credibility of the statements made by prosective 
jurors. The judge has the opportunity of seeing the jurors, 
hearing their testimony, and noting the manner and demeanor 
of the jurors while under examination and thus, is 
in the best position to determine whether or not a 
challenge for cause is valid. It is much more difficult 
for an appellate court to make these determinations. There-
fore, the judgment of the trial court must stand unless 
overwhelming reasons require reversal (BeBee, supra), 
which reasons are noticeably absent in this case. 
Particularly/ appellant has failed to show any actual 
prejudice resulting^from the lower court's decision 
(see discussion, infra, on p.9 ) 
Secondly, appellant should not prevail on appeal 
for the reason that he failed to offer any proof, to 
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the trial court, that the jurors in issue were biased. 
In other words, appellant failed to offer|any foundation 
or basis for his challenge for cause. Therefore the 
trial court had no option but to deny the'challenge. 
It is well settled that the purpose of voir dire is to 
ascertain facts that may serve as a foundation for 
cause challenges (State v. Taylor, 9 Ariz|. App. 290 
451 P.2d 648 (1969) and Rogers v. Citizens National 
Bank, (Okla. 1962), 373 P.2d 256). The prosecutor first 
questioned the jury and asked if there wajs anything in 
any of their minds that would prevent them from 
rendering a fair verdict. Mr. Rock replied: 
"I feel very strongly against 
people that use or sell narcotics. 
I don't know whether I could be fair 
in a verdict or not." (T-23). 
ftftei some further conversation the prosecutor said: 
"Okay. Well, perhaps defense 
counsel would go into this point a 
little more." 
Then the prosecutor asked Mr. Westley: 
". . .do you feel that you |could 
sit on this case, base this case or 
your decision in this case ilf you 
were called to this jury, on the 
evidence that is presented here?" 
(T-25). j 
Mr. Westley replied in the affirmative fT.25). Later, 
when appellant had a chance to voir dir& he failed to 
ask either Mr. Rock or Mr. Westley any questions at all 
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concerning the answers they gave to the prosecutor. 
In other words, appellant didn't even try to prove actual 
bias to the trial court. Respondent submits that it 
is the duty of defense counsel, as an officer of the 
court to investigate and bring out any prejudicial 
feelings that may exist in the minds of the prospective 
jurors (Roberson v. State (Okla 1968), 456 P.2d 595). 
Since appellant did not attempt to show bias he failed 
to lay any foundation before the court for his challenge 
for cause. Thus the court had no choice but to deny 
his challenges. 
Following is a transcription of the discussion 
in chambers beginning at the point where defense counsel 
challenges the jurors. 
"MR. RENSTROM: Your Honor, I 
would at this time challenge^ the 
sitting of Mr. Westley, juror 
number five, an3 also Mr. Rock, 
juror number 15. I think Mr. 
Rock is very vague about his pre-
judices and Mr. Westley subscribes 
apparently to the same thought as 
[Mr. Rock]. (Emphasis added) 
THE COURT: Now who is this, 
which one? 
MR. RENSTROM. Mr. Rock and 
Mr. Westley. 
THE COURT: Okay, correct. 
MR. RENSTROM: He is the one that 
said most of the gentlemen had 
prior experiences which seemed, quite 
honestly, on that part, to suggest 
he might have some prejudice." (T-28,29) 
(Emphasis added). 
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Obviously, as the emphasised portions, supra, demon-
strate, even Mr. Renstrom was not completely certain 
about prejudices which the two jurors might have. 
Thus, the trial court makes the following statement: 
"THE COURT: Well, of course 
• • • 1 expected some inquiry there 
but I didnft hear anything." (T-29) 
(Emphasis added). 
The prosecutor then objected to the challenge on the 
same grounds by saying: 
"MR. BUNDERSON: Well . . . if 
there is some problem, the defense counsel 
is entitled to voir dire to bring out 
and ask them the questions. [So far] 
there is no foundation for any objection 
here." (T-29) (Emphasis added) 
Respondent submits that appellant had full 
opportunity to substantiate his suspicions concerning 
the alleged bias of the jurors, and thus to lay a 
foundation before the court on which he cpould make an 
objection. Failing to do this, the trial court had no 
recourse b"t to den> the challenges. A similar situation 
would arise if, during the state's direct examination, 
defense counsel had objected to a question without 
stating grounds. Obviously the trial judge could, 
and generally should, deny the objection!. 
Another reason for affirmation is, that any 
error which resulted from the lower court's decision 
was induced by appellant as part of his trial strategy. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that an appellant 
may not claim as error any decisions made by the trial 
court which were invited or induced by the appellant as 
part of a strategy decision. (State v. Fair, 2 8 Utah 2d 
242, 501 P.2d 107, 108 (1972), and see also State v. 
Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1975)). 
Any criminal lawyer knows of the various strategies 
available in jury selections. Volumns have been v/ritten 
on the subject. In the instant case appellant had a 
suspicion that one, and possibly two jurors may be 
biased. This suspicion was based on the jurors answers 
to questions asked by the prosecution on voir dire. 
Appellant knew that he could make one of two choices. 
One alternative was, during his own voir dire of the 
jury, to press the jurors for specifics concerning 
their possible prejudices, thus laying a foundation 
for a challenge for cause. The danger however, is that 
if pressed, the jurors may flatly state that they could 
be fair and impartial; then the trial court would 
deny a challenge. The second alternative would be to 
not ask any questions, challenge for Cciuse, and hope 
that the trial court would dismiss the jurors on the 
basis of possible prejudices. Later, if the trial judge 
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denied the challenge, appellant felt he could have 
another chance on appeal. 
Appellant, as his trial strategy, Adopted the 
second alternative. However, there are problems with 
this coure of action. First, appellant thereby failed 
in his duty, as an officer of the court, to assist the 
trial judge in making a proper determination of the 
issue (Roberson, supra). Since appellant'chose not 
to assist the court by laying a foundation for his 
challenge, he is now precluded from complaining of any 
error thereby resulting. The error, if any there be, 
is self-induced (State v. Fair, supra). Second, al-
though he is trying to use his second chance on appeal, 
there is no raoro evidence of prejudice before this court 
now, than thero was before the trial court. It still 
remains that there is no foundation for a challenge. 
Finally, appellant has failed to show any actual 
prejudice as a result of the trial court's decision. 
Without a showing of prejudice, any error must be 
deemed harmless (State v. Winkle, 535 P.2d 82 (Utah 
1975)). Appellant alleges that there was prejudice claiming 
that there is a possibility that he might have had a 
better jury and asking this court to speculate as to 
what would have happened if the trial coujrt had granted 
his challenges. Respondent submits, on the other hand, 
that the question before this court is simply: was 
appellant tried by an impartial jury. The issue is not 
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whether he could have had a better jury or what would 
have happened if. . . . The Utah Supreme Court 
has said that it will not be convinced by "nebulous" 
assertions "without any substantial, believable 
or factual probative substance," such as those now 
made by appellant. (Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 
195, 468 P.2d 369 (1970)). 
Respondent submits that appellant has utterly 
failed to show any prejudice as a result of the jury 
that actually tried him. First, there is no claim 
by appellant that he used all of his per emptories. 
Many courts hold that there is no right to appeal if 
a defendant fails to exhaust his peremptories (Stott 
v. State, 538 P.2d 1061 (Okla. 1975), and People v. 
Miller, 78 Cal. Rptr. 449, 455 P.2d 377 (1969), 
cert. den. 406 U.S. 971, 92 S.Ct. 2417, 32 L.Ed.2d 
672). Therefore, this case is identical to State v. 
Bautista, 30 Urah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973), where-
in a defendant challenged a jury which challenge 
was denied. When the issue was raised on appeal 
the Utah Supreme Court held: 
"No claim is made by the defendants 
that by reason of the court's failure 
to excuse the prospective juror they 
were compelled to use a peremptory 
challenge they miqht have used to 
strike another prospective juror's 
name from the list." (514 P.2d at 
532.) 
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Therefore the Court said: 
"Defendant fail to show that 
any prejudice resulted to them by 
reason of the court's failure to 
grant their challenge for cause," 
(Id.). 
Respondent submits that the Bautista decision is 
controlling. 
Ml""""1 i H PU 
Secondly, there is no claim that any biased 
jurors actually sat on the jury, nor are there any Q * **>* ft** 
facts that could conceivably be used to support such ^ t^r 
an allegation. Therefore there is no shoeing of 
actual prejudice. Appellant has merely raised possibilities 
of hypothetical prejudice and thus his conviction 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO ERROR CONCERNING DISCLOSURES OF 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROSPECTIVE JURORS AND THE 
PROSECUTOR. 
Appellant asvoJ all prospective jilrors if they 
knew the prosecutor. Mr. Rhodes replied negatively. 
Later, at the noon hour Mr. Rhodes accosted the 
prosecutor by saying that he now knew whb the prosecu-
tor's father was, and that he hadn't knoWn before 
(T-34). The juror went on to say something to the 
effect of: 
" Aren't you ever going to be a 
doctor, or I thought you were going 
to be a doctor, or I thought you may 
be a doctor or something along those 
lines." (T-34) . 
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In a discussion in chambers, when the subject 
was brought up, the prosecutor said that nothing else 
had been said. Thereafter the court denied the motion 
for mistrial which appellant had made. Respondent 
submits that the trial court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
Appellant correctly states the law by saying 
that prospective jurors must fully, fairly, and 
truthfully answer all questions on voir dire exam-
ination, and must disclose any material information 
which might bear on their qualifications. The 
question was: Do you know the prosecutor? The 
answer was: No. Later on the juror realized that 
he did know the prosecutor's father. However, that 
knowledge fails to change the fact that the juror 
still did not know the prosecutor himself. There-
fore, the juror honestly answered the appellant's 
question. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THE PROSECUTOR 
PRESENTED HIS CASE IN A CERTAIN MANNER AS AN ATTEMPT 
TO ACCOMMODATE A JUROR. 
During a noon break one of the jurors said 
to the prosecutor that he was in a hurry. The 
prosecutor replied, "Well, there is some more evidence 
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to be presented.11 That was the end of the conver-
sation (T-34) . Later, the prosecutor decided not 
to call one of his witnesses. Appellant speculates 
and hypothesizes that the prosecutor decided not to 
call that witness in an attempt to accommodate the 
juror. Of course, such speculation is not admissable 
as grounds for appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that it is not convinced by hypothetical, nebulous, 
and unsubstantiated assertions (Mayne v. Turner, 24 
Utah 2d 195, 468 P.2d 369 (1970)). Even appellant 
admits that whether the prosecutor was deliberate 
in his actions, " . . . can never be known. . . . " 
(appellant's brief, p. 8). 
CONCLUSION 
Since appellant has shown no prejudice as 
a result of £illeged errors, and since appellant's 
arguments consist primarily of hypothetical fact 
situations, respondent asks that appellant's con-
viction be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
23 6 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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